person who has been awake for more than 22 of the previous 24 hours is impaired by sleep depri vation (www.sleepresearchsociety .org/Government Affairs.aspx).
Chronic sleep deprivation de grades one's ability to recognize the impairments induced by sleep loss. 5 Sleepdeprived clinicians are therefore not likely to assess ac curately the risks posed when they perform procedures in such a state, and they should not be per mitted to decide whether or not to proceed with elective surgery without obtaining the patient's informed consent. In keeping with the ethical and legal standards of informed consent, patients await ing a scheduled elective surgery should be explicitly informed about possible impairments in duced by sleep deprivation and the increased risk of complica tions. They should then be given the choice of proceeding with the surgery, rescheduling it, or pro ceeding with a different physi cian. If patients decide to proceed, they should explicitly consent to do so -in writing, on the day of the procedure, in front of a wit ness, and ideally on a standardized form designed for this purpose.
This approach would repre sent a fundamental shift in the responsibility patients are asked to assume in making decisions about their own care and might prove burdensome to patients and physicians and damaging to the patient-physician relationship. Yet this shift may be necessary until institutions take responsibility for ensuring that patients rarely face such dilemmas. Although it may be challenging to assess sleep deprivation, estimate the risk of resulting harm, and enforce a for mal sleep policy that necessitates the disclosure of clinicians' per sonal information, we believe that the benefit of creating such a policy outweighs the burden. To implement such policies, institu tions will need to absorb the financial and administrative con sequences of canceling and re scheduling elective surgeries in a timely manner. But these steps might ultimately reduce institu tional costs if outcomes are im proved and complications reduced.
The problem of sleep depriva tion vexes medical practice. Pub lic debate and creative solutions are needed to ensure that patients' interests are protected. We be lieve that elective surgeries pro vide an opportunity to create and evaluate a policy designed to avert the adverse effects of sleep de privation on patient outcomes. Strategies learned from applying such policies can then inform oth er areas of practice. Under this law, the next few years will be a period of what econo mists call "creative destruction": our fragmented, feeforservice health care delivery system will be transformed into a higher quality, higherproductivity sys tem with strong incentives for efficient, coordinated care. 1 Con sequently, the actions of physi cians and hospitals during this period will determine the struc ture of the delivery system for many years. The implications will Physicians vs. Hospitals as Leaders of ACOs be profound for hospitals' domi nant role in the health care sys tem and for physicians' income, autonomy, and work environ ments.
The ACA aims to simultane ously improve the quality of care and reduce costs. Doing so will require focused efforts to improve care for the 10% of patients who account for 64% of all U.S. health care costs. 2 Much of this cost derives from high rates of unnec essary hospitalizations and poten tially avoidable complications, 3 and these, in turn, are partially driven by feeforservice incen tives that fail to adequately re ward coordinated care that effec tively prevents illness. The ACA includes numerous provisions de signed to catalyze transformation of the delivery system, moving it away from fee for service and to ward coordinated care (see table) .
These provisions will result in incentives for the development of the information systems and infrastructure necessary for bet ter and more efficient manage ment of chronic conditions. Such outpatient changes will be rein forced by hospital readmissions policies that improve handoffs and by initiatives to reduce the occurrence of hospitalacquired infections and "never events."
The desired consequence of these changes is enhanced terti ary prevention, leading to sub stantial reductions in unnecessar ily expensive specialty referrals and tests and avoidable compli cations. And the ultimate conse quences should be significant im provements in health and fewer exacerbations of chronic illnesses.
Achievement of this level of care coordination will require the development of larger integrated delivery organizations -prefer ably, accountable care organiza tions (ACOs) that incorporate pri mary care practices structured as patientcentered medical homes and that can support new invest ments in information systems and care teams and can maintain ser vice hours resembling those of retailers. 4 A move toward ACOs will mean major changes in the structure of physicians' practices, since even physiciangroup-based ACOs may include one or more hospitals, though they may in stead contract with hospitals for specific services chosen on the basis of their relative value.
Larger ACOs are likely to be contracted directly by payers to manage the continuum of care. They are also likely to bear fi nancial risk, receiving greater payments for the care of chroni cally ill patients and accepting at least partial responsibility for the costs of specialists' visits, tests, emergency room visits, and hospitalizations. Memories of the inflexible managedcare gatekeep ers of the 1990s could lead to theoretically permissive, if prac tically narrow, networks of pro viders, although these organiza tions will need to work closely with a small group of efficient specialists and facilities to achieve their quality and efficiency goals.
A crucial question is who will control these ACOs. We can en vision two possible futures: one of physiciancontrolled ACOs, with physicians affiliating and con tracting with hospitals, control ling the flow of funds through the marketplace; and one of hos pitalcontrolled ACOs that will employ physicians. Whoever con trols the ACOs will capture the largest share of any savings.
For physicians to control ACOs, they would have to overcome sev eral hurdles. The first is collabo ration: ACOs will require clinical, administrative, and fiscal coop eration, and physicians have sel dom demonstrated the ability to effectively organize themselves into groups, agree on clinical guidelines, and devise ways to equitably distribute money. Near ly three quarters of officebased physicians, representing nearly 95% of all U.S. practices, work in groups of five or fewer physi cians. 5 Since much of the sav ings from coordinating care will come from successfully avoiding tests, procedures, and hospital izations, the question of how to divide profits among primary care physicians and specialists will be contentious. Proceduralists who would end up losing income are likely to resist key structural changes.
In addition, ACOs will require sophisticated information tech nology (IT) systems and skilled managers in order to hold clini cians accountable. Historically, doctors have not shown the will ingness to assume more capital risk or to invest in overhead. Fi nally, memories of the failed capi tation models of the 1990s may make some physicians hesitant to participate.
If hospitals are to control ACOs, they, too, will need to over come barriers. First, they will need to trade nearterm revenue for longterm savings. Hospitals are typically at the center of cur rent health care markets, and by focusing on procedures and se verely ill patients, most have been fairly profitable. Building an ACO will require hospitals to shift to a more outpatientfocused, coor In these places, hospitals have the advantage, since they traditionally have more management talent, accounting capability, IT systems, and cheaper access to capital than do physician groups. Holding off on creating ACOs is likely to be a bad longterm strategy for physicians. First, health care reform has passed, bringing extensive changes, and it would be very difficult to re peal or modify the ACA so as to delay reforms. Congress's payas yougo rules would require law makers to find equivalent savings if they discarded ACA provisions 
Summary Implications

Patient-Centered Medical Homes ( §3502)
Community-based, interdisciplinary, interprofessional teams that support primary care practices
Will drive improved organization of outpatient care
Government to provide grants or enter into contracts with eligible entities
Will fund care coordination and a team-based approach
Accountable Care Organizations ( §3022)
Shared-savings program that encompasses primary care, specialist practice, and hospitals
Requires vertical coordination
Care processes to be redesigned for the efficient delivery of highquality services
Most of the savings are likely to come from hospitals
Bundled Payments ( §3023)
Pilot program Will provide incentives for care-delivery systems to reduce costs in order to increase margins Applicable to eight conditions selected by the secretary of health and human services An "episode of care" defined as the period from 3 days before admission through 30 days after discharge
Readmissions Reduction Program ( §3025)
Reduces payments for readmissions Will motivate hospitals to engage with care coordinators and organize delivery systems better Applicable to three conditions selected by the secretary of health and human services; to be expanded in 2015
Secretary to determine what is considered a readmission (i.e., minimum time between admissions)
Hospital-Acquired Conditions ( §3008)
Payments for care for hospital-acquired conditions to be reduced, starting in 2015
Will provide hospitals an incentive to standardize protocols and procedures to reduce hospital-acquired conditions Individual hospitals' infection data to be made available online
The New Established institutional rela tionships tend to persist because of "path dependence": decisions about the future are constrained by decisions made in the past, even though circumstances may change. Although it is unequivo cally inefficient, inequitable, and otherwise problematic to finance health care with a combination of employerbased coverage, Medi care, and Medicaid, it has proved impossible to change this struc ture. Similarly, once the new pay ment system and other changes included in the ACA transform the relationship between hospi tals and physicians, the new or der will become entrenched and persist until the next period of creative destruction.
If physicians come to domi nate, hospitals' census will de cline, and their revenue will fall, with little compensatory growth in outpatient services, since phy sicians are likely to selfrefer. This decline will, in turn, lower hos pitals' bond ratings, making it harder for them to borrow mon ey and expand. As hospitals' fi nancial activity and employment decline, their influence in their local communities will also wane. And it will be hard for them to recover from this diminished role.
Conversely, if hospitals come to dominate ACOs, they will ac crue more of the savings from the new delivery system, and phy sicians' incomes and status as independent professionals will decline. Once relegated to the position of employees and con tractors, physicians will have dif ficulty regaining income, status, the ability to raise capital, and the influence necessary to con trol health care institutions.
Therefore, the actor who moves first effectively is likely to as sume the momentum and domi nate the local market. A wait andsee approach could succeed if the first mover executes poor ly, failing to coordinate care and manage risk. But rather than controlling destiny, cautious ac tors will be hanging their fate on the mistakes of others.
In the early 20th century, the health care system changed dra matically with the introduction of antisepsis and the increasing safety and success of surgery: hospitals gained power as they became associated with hope and health rather than fear and death. Now, after decades of hospital hegemony, we stand at another crossroads; physicians may be able to gain market leadership if they move first. How the development of ACOs plays out over the next few years is likely to have lasting implications for the practice of medicine, patients' experience of health care, and health care costs in the United States. The next decade will be critical for develop ing an effective model and mak ing historic changes in the struc ture of our health care system. This article (10.1056/NEJMp1011712) was published on November 10, 2010, at NEJM .org.
